By Bud Labitan
Saturday, December 07, 2013
By Bud Labitan
Thursday, April 18, 2013
Yield on Cost Is Warren Buffett’s Coca-Cola Magic
I started emailing friends and doing simple, somewhat crazy math estimations to see if I could find the truth myself. I am even embarrassed to say that I sent an email to Mr. Buffett with flawed math. Friends, with their good intentions, would tell me to return to “Time Value of Money” calculations, and learn those well. They would say something like, "Coca-Cola is a great company with nice rate of returns and steadily increasing dividends, but it only gives you a range of 9% to 11% returns."
I would think, “How can that be? My investing heroes, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger” always smile and resist cries from shareholders to sell the the Coca-Cola (KO) shares. What I rediscovered is that the magic of Warren Buffett’s and Charlie Munger’s 1988 purchase of Coca-Cola stock is: yield on cost.
Think of yield on cost” as “yield relative to my cost” or “the yield received per share cost” or "yield/per share cost." It can be described as “yield/cost per share.”
I sort of backed into finding that bond concept. My initial thinking went something like this: Think of it as getting an average of a $570 million dividend every single year from that principal investment cost of $1.299 billion in Coca-Cola. If you multiply $570 million x 24 years, we get $13.15 billion. Add this $13.15 billion to the $1.29 billion principal, and we get very, very close to the current value of $14.44 billion in BRK's ownership of Coca-Cola.
Bear with me on this basic "non-compounding" math below and you will see how Buffett received about $570 million for every year of that his principal investment of $1.299 billion in Coca-Cola. Keep in mind, I was trying to stay with simple math. Look at their cost of $1.299 billion, 0.44 rate of average annual return, and 0.57, which represents my assumption of $570 million.
0.57 x 23 (23 because of end-of-year adjustment), plus one-half of year of approximately 0.29, so 1.299 + 13.43 = 14.73, is darn close.
I found an old 2010 article that said: When Buffett began purchasing stock in Coca Cola in 1988, many Wall Street analysts were skeptical because it seemed only a matter of time before other beverage companies would take away its market share. In addition, Coca-Cola had reported earnings down 2 percent from the previous year, and had an unimpressive P/E ratio of between 14 to 19. At the time, shares of KO were worth between $35 and $45. The stock has split three times since then, and is now priced in the $60 range. By 1995, Buffett owned 100,000 shares of the company with a cost basis of roughly $1.2 billion. As of September 2010, Buffett’s unrealized gains on KO were $10.4 billion. This comes out to a 766 percent increase in value. This is one of Buffett’s greatest investing triumphs.
Using the same simple logic... When $2 grows into $6, no matter the duration, we say 6/2=3 and 3*100 = a 300% increase in value, no matter if it takes 1 or 900 years. In this simple math, duration is irrelevant.
Now, by 2013, KO stock had split 4 times and BRK has 400 million shares with a cost basis of $1.299 billion, and a market value of $14.5 billion. Forget for a moment that it took about 24.5 years to get there. Furthermore, suspend the idea of splits because we know the cost and the present dollar value that is already split-adjusted.
When $1.299 billion grows to $14.500 billion, we say 14.500/1.299=11.16 and *100 is a 1,116% increase in value. Again, in simple math, how much can we allocate to each year? Let us use a simple average and make it even. Now, a simple rough average of 1116/24.5 years=45.55% approximate gain per year, and this does not even count the value of the dividends.
(Next, I get a little theoretical.) Let us add in the low-ball but fair figure of $5 billion for all the dividends (with no major time value of money adjustments). When $1.299 grows to $19.500, we say 19.500/1.299=15.01 and *100 is a 1,501% increase in value. Now, a simple rough average of 1501/24.5 years=61.27% gain in value (on top of the $1.29 billion) per year, or around $570 million each year.
Now, I felt like I was getting close to why Buffett's 1988 bargain purchase of KO is so powerful and important. Next, I got a nice email from Richard Griebe. Griebe said he was starting to see the way I was looking at this investment in KO. “Rather than looking at the compounding of value over time, you are looking at the average annual increase in value against the original $1.299 billion invested. So, if I think of the original stock purchase as buying a bond instead, that “bond” has paid a continuously increasing interest rate over time. Following your computations to where you included dividends to calculate an average 61.27% gain per year or, in my bond model, Buffett bought a bond for $1.299 billion that has paid on average coupon of 61.27% annually. This is a feat that would make gangsters jealous. Thanks for patiently discussing this fascinating case study with me.
With Griebe’s positive words, I felt encouraged and I thanked him. Next, I kept searching the Internet for this “yield” concept that I was looking for. I was looking for Buffett’s effective yield per share compared to my yield per share. I stumbled upon the concept of yield on cost.
WOW! That is it! Yield per “share cost.”
Did I realize that 1.299 billion/400 million shares = Buffett's $3.25 per share cost per share of KO? Did you?
From the website Investopedia, Yield on cost (YOC) is defined as: “The annual dividend rate of a security divided by the average cost basis of the investments. It shows the dividend yield of the original investment. If the number of shares owned by the investor does not change, the yield on cost will increase if the company increases the dividend it pays to shareholders; otherwise it will remain the same."
To calculate yield on cost for a stock, an investor must divide the stock's annual dividend by the average cost basis per share and multiple the resulting number by 100 (to get a percentage). For example, an investor who purchased 10 shares of stock at $15 and 20 shares at $18 would have an average cost basis of $17 per share ($15*10 + $18*20)/(10 + 20). If the annual dividend is $0.90 per share, the yield on cost would be 5.29% ($0.90/$17 * 100).
Using this information, and knowing that Buffett's cost per share of KO is $3.25, can I calculate his yield on cost for 2012? The 2012 dividends per share were: March 13, 2013 $0.28, Nov. 28, 2012 $0.26, Sept. 12, 2012 $0.26, June 13, 2012 $0.26, March 13, 2012 $0.26, and the sum is $1.30
So, $1.30 / $3.25 = 0.40 and 0.40 * 100 = 40%. Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway received a 40% yield on cost just for the year 2012 dividends alone!
Alternatively, and again thinking in bond-like thoughts, if we believe the $570 million average return per year on top of the $1.299 billion principal. $570 million / 400 million shares is 1.43, and that is like a gain of 43% each year over the initial investment.
Prediction: Since 45% + 40% = 85%, I predict that the total yearly return will soon surpass the initial $1.29 billion cost basis of this Coca-Cola investment.
Sunday, April 07, 2013
Coca Cola's Valuation, Warren Buffett's 1988 Purchase
In 1987, Coca-Cola was refocusing on its core business and sold its Columbia Pictures subsidiary. The “New Coke” fiasco of 1985 was past. The company was repurchasing common stock. So, how did the business look in the eyes of Buffett and Munger?
As some of you know, “The Four Filters Invention of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger” book explored their investment decision making process.” We believe that Buffett and Munger made a major contribution to the field of Behavioral Finance by applying these four sequential filter steps:
Filter #1: Look for a business you understand, within your “circle of competence.”
Filter #2: Look for a Durable Competitive Advantage
Filter #3: Insist on Able & Trustworthy Managers
Filter #4: Insist on Ben Graham’s Margin of Safety where your purchase price is significantly below the intrinsic value.
Coca-Cola passed these filters. Consider the significance of each filter like this. Filter #1: Understanding means finding an understandable business with good economics. Filter #2: Look for a Durable Competitive Advantage. This means having repeat customers. Filter #3: Insist on Able & Trustworthy Managers because management must have both qualities. Why? The able but untrustworthy manager can lead to disaster.
Filter #4: Insist on a Margin of Safety where your purchase price is significantly below the intrinsic value. This is Ben Graham’s quest: to buy a business at a significant bargain so that the risk of capital loss is minimized; and, the probability of capital appreciation is maximized. Therefore, let us look at Coca-Cola’s intrinsic value per share in 1988. Coca-Cola is a business with a differentiated and continuing competitive advantage. Its economic moat is deep and wide. It has a combination of a special brand advantage, a large-scale “cost of production” advantage, and a global network distribution advantage. We could say that it has three moats around its economic castle. In addition, its managers work to build this moat bigger every day.
A customer generally asks for a Coke by name. Customers do not buy a ‘cola’. Charlie Munger said, “The social proof phenomenon which comes right out of psychology gives huge advantages to scale—for example, with a very wide distribution, which of course is hard to get. One advantage of Coca-Cola is that it's available almost everywhere in the world.”
In 1988, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger began buying stock in the Coca-Cola Company for the Berkshire Hathaway portfolio. They purchased about 7% of the company for $1.02 billion. This turned out to be one of Berkshire's most lucrative investments. Berkshire Hathaway now owns 8.9 percent or 400 million shares of Coca-Cola.
Buffett and Munger knew that commodity companies sell products or services that can be reproduced. In 1982, Buffett said this about commodity companies: “Businesses in industries with both substantial over-capacity and a "commodity" product (undifferentiated in any customer-important way by factors such as performance, appearance, service support etc.) are prime candidates for profit troubles.” There are also companies that market commodity products so well that they distinguish their commodity product from that of their competitors. These put their own special ‘brand’ upon their product. They can achieve this by the marketing mix of price, product, placement, and promotions. In addition, continuous improvement in terms of higher quality production and service is always a plus.
In 1993, Warren Buffett said this about companies with competitive advantages: ‘Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market.’ Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.’
Coca-Cola has a strong brand identity in the global market and it has pricing power. It is one of most respected brands in the world. Coca-Cola utilizes a great amount of positive advertising to maintain the Coke brand. The amount of advertising is also a barrier to entry; it makes it impossible for brands with low capital to gain a comparable amount of brand awareness. This creates an expensive barrier to entry.
Recently, Coca-Cola’s 5Yr Gross Margin (5-Year Avg.) is approximately 62%. Its Net Profit Margin (5-Year Avg.) is approximately 22%, while the industry Net Profit Margin (5-Year Avg.) is 18.0%. Coca-Cola also has better earning power efficiency in term of Free Cash Flow per unit of sale.
As of 2012, Coca-Cola has a 5-Year Average Return on Equity (ROE) of 29.9%. Its worldwide distribution system is also major competitive advantage.
Are these advantages sustainable for the next 10 years? Yes. However, Coca-Cola has recently dropped out of the top ten brand value list for the first time. This may be underpinned by a consumer trend towards healthier, non-carbonated drinks. Coca-Cola recognized “obesity and health concerns” as potential risks for the company in the 2010 annual report. However, there is little doubt that Coca-Cola’s loyal brand following will sustain its competitive advantage. Coca-Cola recognizes the need to sustain marketing and increase innovation.
In its 2010 annual report, they acknowledged the need to continue to selectively expand into other profitable segments of the nonalcoholic beverages segment.
From the 2012 annual report: “Obesity and other health concerns may reduce demand for some of our products. Consumers, public health officials and government officials are highly concerned about the public health consequences associated with obesity, particularly among young people. In addition, some researchers, health advocates and dietary guidelines are encouraging consumers to reduce consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages, including those sweetened with HFCS (High-Fructose Corn Syrup) or other nutritive sweeteners. Increasing public concern about these issues; possible new taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages; additional governmental regulations concerning the marketing, labeling, packaging or sale of our beverages; and negative publicity resulting from actual or threatened legal actions against us or other companies in our industry relating to the marketing, labeling or sale of sugar-sweetened beverages may reduce demand for our beverages, which could adversely affect our profitability.”
A historically wonderful business, Coca-Cola’s able and trustworthy managers are motivated to invest in its supply chain network to “leverage the size and scale of the Coca-Cola system to gain a competitive advantage.” With this “moat building” in mind, we believe that that Coca-Cola will be successful in maintaining its economic franchise and current barriers to entry.
On October 18, 2012, Coca-Cola announced that it planned to purchase up to 500 million shares of the company's common stock. Such actions add value to the “intrinsic value” of each remaining share outstanding.
Consider why the Coca-Cola Company is such a good business from an investor’s point of view. Both Coke and Pepsi make products we enjoy. As an investor, we prefer the Coca-Cola Company. One reason is the amount of Free Cash Flow generated for every sale. Another reason is the amount of Free Cash Flow generated after expenses.
Charlie Munger once stated: "Warren often talks about these discounted cash flows, but I've never seen him do one." Warren Buffett responded: "It’s sort of automatic... It ought to just kind of scream at you that you've got this huge margin of safety." Buffett went on to state: "We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure. This figure will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses."
This exercise is our quantitative estimation of Coca-Cola's Intrinsic Value Per Share in 1988. First, we describe our 2-stage "discounted cash flow" valuation model. This estimating model is strict. It assumes a good business will only "live" for 20 years. Within this model, we apply compounding growth to the first 10 years. Then, we assume a lower growth rate for years 11 until the end of year 20. This restriction of lesser growth in years 11 thru 20 means that this restriction imposes a degree of conservatism on top of the estimator’s optimism during the model’s early growth years. Then, after we sum up all the individual end of year cash, we should apply a discount rate and bring that sum back to present value. At this point, we divide by the number of shares outstanding.
First, keep in mind, Warren Buffett said: "Intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure. This figure will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses."
Again, we emphasize that our model is an "estimation method" that imposes conservatism by limiting growth in the final ten years. It is just a model for 1988. At that time, KO stock traded between $35 and $45.25. From 1987 to 1988, the net income grew 14% and the net income per common share grew 17.3%. The number of shares outstanding in 1988 was 364,612,000 shares. We used a discount rate of 6.0% because that is the approximate 20-year average from 1988 to 2008. (see below)
Average: 10-Year US Treasury Rates from 1988–2008
1988 8.50% 1998 5.26%
1989 8.50% 1999 5.64%
1990 8.55% 2000 6.03%
1991 7.86% 2001 5.02%
1992 7.01% 2002 4.61%
1993 5.87% 2003 4.02%
1994 7.08% 2004 4.27%
1995 6.58% 2005 4.29%
1996 6.44% 2006 4.79%
1997 6.35% 2007 4.63%
2008 3.67%
AVERAGE: 5.95%
Coca-Cola’s 1988 Annual Report does not show Free Cash Flows. We can calculate FCFs below using available information from its 1988 financial statements like this:
The formula for calculating Free Cash Flow (FCF) is:
Free Cash Flow = Operating Cash Flow – Capital Expenditures
Free Cash Flow = (EBIT x (1–Tax Rate)) + (Depreciation & Amortization) – (Changes in Working Capital) – Capital Expenditure
Remember that Operating Income is referred to as EBIT or (Earnings Before Interest & Taxes, shown on the Income Statement.
Working Capital = (Current Assets) – (Current Liabilities)
EBIT is also known as Operating Income = $1,598,300,000
EBIT = Earnings Before Interest & Taxes
Tax Rate in 1988 = .34 or 34%
Depreciation & Amortization = $169,768,000
Changes in Working Capital = $227,993,000
1988’s Working Capital = 1988 Total Current Assets – 1988 Total Current Liabilities
$376,535,000 = $3,245,432,000 – $2,868,897,000
1987 Working Capital = 1987 Total Current Assets – 1987 Total Current Liabilities
$148,542,000 = $4,231,921,000 – $4,083,379,000
Capital Expenditures = $387,000,000
(EBIT x (1–Tax Rate)) + (Depreciation & Amortization) – (Changes in Working Capital) – Capital Expenditure = Free Cash Flow
($1,598,300,000 x (1– .34)) + $169,768,000 – $227,993,000 – $387,000,000 = FCF
($1,598,300,000 x (.66)) + $169,768,000 – $227,993,000 – $387,000,000 = FCF
$1,054,878,000 + $169,768,000 – $227,993,000 – $387,000,000 = FCF
$1,054,878,000 + $169,768,000 – $227,993,000 – $387,000,000 = $609,653,000
We used an assumed FCF annual growth of 15 percent for the first 10 years; and we assume 12 percent growth from years 11 to the end of year 20. Keep in mind that this is how our estimating model was designed. In the real world, you should adjust your model to better fit a superior or inferior business’ longevity.
In fact, for a great company like Coca-Cola, you could lengthen the second stage of your model out to another 5-20 years. For the purpose of conservatism, we chose to stay with our 20 year two-stage model with the compounding growth set at 15% and 12% respectively. These are reasonable expectations for that period, based on Warren Buffett’s 1990 letter where he wrote: “we hope to have look-through earnings grow about 15% annually.”
In our model, the resulting estimated intrinsic value per share (after discounting the sum back to the present) is approximately $78.67. If Warren Buffett bought at or around the Market Price of $40, he obtained a margin of safety of around 49%.
At this point, it is important to remember that Intrinsic Value is not a precise number. It is an estimated range. It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong. As you can see below, both valuation models have estimated valuations that are fairly close to one another. The DCF/FCF model inspired by John Burr Williams estimates Coca-Cola's intrinsic value at around $79. Alternatively, Benjamin Graham's classic formula estimates the value of Coca-Cola to be approximately $87.48.
We believe that it is better to go with the more conservative estimation, and examine the business qualities within the Four Filters Process. The Four Filters are a search for: “Understandable first-class businesses, with enduring competitive advantages, accompanied by first-class managements, available at a bargain price.” This is discussed in the next chapter.
Here is the Ben Graham formula: V = EPS = (8.5 + 2g)
Where V = Intrinsic Value
EPS = Earnings Per Share for ttm (trailing twelve months)
8.5 = Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio for a no-growth business
G = reasonable expected 7–10 year growth rate
For our 1988 Coca-Cola valuation:
V = $2.43 x (8.5 + (2x14))
V = $2.43 x (8.5 + 28)
V = $2.43 x 36.5
V = $88.70
Alternatively, if we imagine Buffett performing this calculation in his head, his modified Graham formula might resemble something like this:
V = EPS = (8 + 2g)
V = $2.43 x (8 + (2x14))
V = $2.43 x (8 + 28)
V = $2.43 x 36
V = $87.48
WARNING
Remember that intrinsic value estimations comprise Filter #4 of Buffett & Munger's Four Filters investment process. Be sure to consider all four filters during your investment research & analysis.
No matter which estimation method you adopt, keep in mind that Warren Buffett bought an understandable business with sustainable competitive advantages, able trustworthy managers, and a significant bargain relative to its intrinsic value. These four filter factors describe the wonderfulness or magic of a business.
*****
Friday, January 20, 2012
MOATS : Competitive Advantages of 70 Buffett and Munger Businesses
find it here: http://www.lulu.com/spotlight/4filters
The MOATS book introduction audio mp3 file: http://www.frips.com/moats.mp3
audio file of Wells Fargo, WFC chapter from MOATS book:
http://www.frips.com/wfc.mp3
audio file of the Johnson and Johnson chapter from MOATS:
http://www.frips.com/jnj.mp3
audio file of the Costco chapter in MOATS http://www.frips.com/costco.mp3
audio file of the American Express chapter: http://www.frips.com/axp.mp3
The IBM Chapter from MOATS. Why did Buffett buy into a technology services
company after so many years? http://www.frips.com/ibm.mp3
Here is a 1 min : 32 sec audio file of Warren Buffett talking about an
economic castle and its moat http://www.frips.com/wbmoat.mp3
Monday, October 24, 2011
Herman Cain May Change World View On Taxes
Herman Cain's 9-9-9 Plan is a Vision for Economic Renewal that can be good for America and the world's economies. He believes that the natural state of our economy is prosperity. Freedom from excessive regulation and excessive taxation ensures that.
Cain believes that in order to return to prosperity, Government must get off our backs, out of our pockets and out of our way.
His Economic Guiding Principles include:
1. Production drives the economy, not spending. Production is the engine, consumption is the caboose. We can not spend our way to prosperity. Government spending is like taking a bucket of water from the deep end of the pool, pouring it in the shallow end. Then they HOPE that the water level will CHANGE.
2. Risk taking drives growth. Business formation and job creation are dependent on entrepreneurs taking risks. Investors who fund those entrepreneurs likewise take risks.
3. Measurements must be dependable. A dollar must always be a dollar just as an hour is always 60 minutes. Sound money is crucial for prosperity.
UNITE, never DIVIDE; UNITED around ECONOMIC GROWTH
Cain states that when one party is so focused on spending so that the other must focus on cutting, we must unite around economic growth. Unite income tax payers with payroll taxpayers so we all pull for low rates Unite those wanting to eliminate deductions with those seeking lower rates. Unite the Flat-Taxers with the Fair-Taxers.
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Price To Value - Chapter Seven: Phil Carret’s Ideas
CHAPTER SEVEN: Phil Carret’s Ideas
from the new book Price To Value (Acalmix)
Philip Carret founded Pioneer Fund in 1928, six years before Ben Graham wrote the 1st edition of Security Analysis. Carret also wrote a useful and enlightening book called “The Art of Speculation.” And, Warren Buffett stated that Philip Carret “had the best truly longterm investment record of anyone I know."
What made Carret so successful in investing? I asked Frank Betz, of Carret Zane Capital Management, a similar question. Frank shared a partner's desk with Phil Carret as his personal assistant from the mid-eighties until Phil's death in 1998. Carret was then over age 101, and he was still commuting most days from his Scarsdale home to the mid-town NYC office of Carret and Company that he founded in 1962. There he was still functioning fully in the management of client portfolios. Betz recalled that Phil was a voracious reader not only of dozens of corporate annual reports and daily newspapers, but of an eclectic variety of books ranging from philosophy, history, biography and economic subjects. Phil Carret always claimed the most useful information he gleaned from this was from his concentration on the detailed footnotes appended to annual reports.
While Frank was already a long experienced money center banker, analyst, and investor when he was recruited to work for Carret by Phil's son Donald, I wanted to know how this interaction affected his own approach to investing. Frank believes that “working with Phil Carret, significantly sharpened my senses.”
Frank Betz also remembers that Carret would warn others against following fads in investing, and he often cited one of the most important characteristics of successful investors is patience. In the preface of his book, Phil Carret wrote, “The man who looks upon speculation as a possible means of avoiding work will get little benefit from this book. It is written rather for the man who is fascinated by the complexity of the forces which produce the ceaseless ebb and flow of security prices, who wishes to get a better understanding of them.”
“Successful speculation requires capital, courage and judgment. The speculator himself must supply all three. Natural good judgment is not enough. The speculator’s judgment must be trained to understand the multitudinous facts of finance.” Like mine, it was Carret’s hope that his book would assist his readers.
At the 1996 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting, Warren Buffett said: "The main thing is to find wonderful businesses, like Phil Carret, who's here today, always did. He's one of my heroes, and that's an approach he's used. If you've never met Phil, don't miss the opportunity. You'll learn more talking with him for fifteen minutes than by listening to me here all day."
Let us take a brief look at Carret’s somewhat contrarian view on oil. “Oil is produced in thousands of oil fields on every continent in the world. The temporary absence from the market of a single country - even a country as important to oil as Iraq or Kuwait - will have only a temporary effect. Other oil producers can boost their output quickly. And in the United States, we have abundant supplies of natural gas, which can serve as a substitute for oil to a considerable extent.”
More importantly, take a look at Phil Carret's "12 Commandments of Investing":
1. Never hold fewer than 10 different securities covering five different fields of business;
2. At least once every six months, reappraise every security held;
3. Keep at least half the total fund in income producing securities;
4. Consider (dividend) yield the least important factor in analyzing any stock;
5. Be quick to take losses and reluctant to take profits;
6. Never put more than 25% of a given fund into securities about which detailed information is not readily and regularly available;
7. Avoid inside information as you would the plague;
8. Seek facts diligently, advice never;
9. Ignore mechanical formulas for value in securities;
10. When stocks are high, money rates rising and business prosperous, at least half a given fund should be placed in short-term bonds;
11. Borrow money sparingly and only when stocks are low, money rates low and falling and business depressed;
12. Set aside a moderate proportion of available funds for the purchase of long-term options on stocks in promising companies whenever available.
We see that Phil Carret exercised safety-based commandments. And, the last one appears to be targeted towards “intelligent speculation.” There, he advised setting aside a proportion of available funds for long-term options on stocks in promising companies whenever available. With careful study and patience, Carret knew he could predict good outcomes. Philip Carret died on May 28, 1998, at age 101.
- - - - - - -
“Price To Value” is about Intelligent Speculation and Decision Framing. Readers will benefit from this book if it stimulates better thinking into the most important factors crucial to decision making. These decision framing ideas can be applied across different asset classes. First, the book presents the four investing decision filters in simplified terms. Then, it extends these ideas by looking into the intelligent speculation ideal described by Benjamin Graham in his tenth lecture of 1946.
Bud Labitan's books are available on Amazon.com and Lulu.com
http://stores.lulu.com/4filters
Friday, July 11, 2008
The Book

I think Buffett and Munger invented an amazing Behavioral Finance Formula or Process that is underappreciated by the business and academic communities. On paper as early as the 1977 BRK annual letter, their work in designing a mixed qualitative + quantitative formula may be worthy of a Nobel Prize in Economics and Behavioral Finance. So, in my new self-published book "The Four Filters Invention of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger" ( www.frips.com ) I examine each of the basic steps they perform in "framing and making" an investment decision. I made this book a small and focused look into this amazing invention within "Behavioral Finance."Buffett mentions the Four Filters this way: "Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag."
In my view, the genius of Buffett and Munger's four filters process was to "capture all the important stakeholders" in one "multi-variable" equation. Imagine...Products, Enduring Customers, Managers, and Margin-of-Safety... all the important stakeholders for business success in one mixed "qual + quant" formula...The genius of the Munger and Buffett collaboration. And, quality bargains at 50 cents on the dollar may soon appear; Use the Four Filters!
Thanks for your interest in my book and helping to promote awareness of my book. Here is a 10 minute audio book summary: http://www.frips.com/4fsummary.mp3
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
Behavioral Finance
Thursday, March 06, 2008
CHAPTER ONE OF FIVE: UNDERSTANDING
What I Learned from Warren Buffett.
By Bud Labitan
CHAPTER ONE OF FIVE: UNDERSTANDING
Over the years, I have read most of the books about Warren Buffett, his teacher Benjamin Graham, and his business partner Charlie Munger. I have also listened to many hours of audio lectures and interviews. During this time, I have been consistently interested in how Warren Buffett frames an investment decision and how he arrives at a winning investment prospect.
Warren Buffett has talked about the Four Filters in several ways, but the sequence is always the same: “Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag.” Buffett has also phrased the four filter process in this way: “When buying companies or common stocks, we look for understandable first-class businesses, with enduring competitive advantages, accompanied by first-class managements, available at a bargain price.”
These ideas sound so simple. Many people hear them at the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting in Omaha each year. Yet, few people have stopped to think about the importance and effectiveness of each individual filter.
This is a small and valuable book that concentrates on the four sequential filters that will make anyone a better and more skillful investment decision maker. It is dedicated to Janine Rueth and Victoria Labitan. In this book, I squeeze “all the lean beef” into five chapters: “the Four Filter chapters and a summary chapter.” The final summary chapter will tie the filters together and demonstrate, with enthusiastic attitude, why these filters work to maximize the probability of investing success from both a mathematical and a practical point of view.
In developing understanding of a company and its products, Buffett framed the diligent mental process this way: “If I were looking at a company, I would put myself in the frame of mind that I had just inherited that company, and it was the only asset my family was ever going to own. What would I do with it? What am I thinking about? What am I worried about? Who are my customers? Go out and talk to them. Find out the strengths and weaknesses of this particular company versus other ones.”
Like a detective, he begins by asking himself basic questions. He looks for simple things that he can count. He looks for companies run by able and owner-oriented people.
Said Mr. Buffett, “Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag.”
I have played with the four filters and twisted them into 4 clusters this way:
1. Products 2. Customers 3. Management 4. Margin of Safety
Why do the filters work? I will give you a hint - Elaboration and Elimination.
In terms of mathematical probabilities, think of each stop along the four filters as a mutually exclusive and additive event. If a company passes a couple of filters, it is, by the process of elimination, farther to the right on a normal distribution curve, from an “investment prospect” point of view. If this were a field of racing horses, movement along each step of the Four Filters path, the prospect or suspect enters a subset of “better than average” horse. In my view, practicing these steps will make you a better thinker.
The majority of Berkshire Haathaway companies have important competitive advantages that will endure over time. For Warren Buffett and his shareholders, it is comforting to be in businesses where some mistakes can be made and yet satisfactory overall performance can be achieved.
How were these four filters developed? Over the course of their investing experiences, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger have had many discussions about the qualities of both bad and good businesses. Warren Buffett’s advantage is passion and attitude for sensible investing. He learned from Ben Graham that the key to successful investing was the purchase of shares in good businesses when market prices were at a large discount from underlying business values. Sound owner-oriented business principles, along with time, training, and temperment have mabe them even better investors.
So what does Ben Graham add to filter number one, understanding? Graham, according to Buffett, added three basic ideas that can enhance our intellectual investing framework.
Graham’s ideas can help us do reasonably well in stocks.
Buffett on Graham:
His three basic ideas - and none of them are complicated or require any mathematical talent or anything of the sort - are:
1. that you should look at stocks as part ownership of a business,
2. that you should look at market fluctuations in terms of his "Mr. Market" example and make them your friend rather than your enemy by essentially profiting from folly rather than participating in it, and finally,
3. the three most important words in investing are "Margin of safety" - which Ben talked about in his last chapter of The Intelligent Investor - always building a 15,000 pound bridge if you're going to be driving 10,000 pound trucks across it.
I think those three ideas 100 years from now will still be regarded as the three cornerstones of sound investment.
In developing our understanding of a company and its products, Warren Buffett advises students to “Think for yourself.”
He reads annual reports of the company he is looking at, and he reads the annual reports of the competitors. He has said that annual reports are the main source of the study material needed or understanding. Of course, he also cautions students to focus on their own circle of competence. Notice the filtering process of his statement here: “Draw a circle around the businesses you understand and then eliminate those that fail to qualify on the basis of value, good management, and limited exposure to hard times.”
Just as a good leader has been tested by tough times and has a solid followership, a good company will have a loyal followership or customer base. The wonderful ones will have some sort of pricing power.
Charlie Munger understood the importance of thinking about the “Wonderful Business” early, while Warren Buffett was still buying cheap “Cigar-Butts.” Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, Buffett acquired a Baltimore department store called Hochschild Kohn. That was purchased through a retailing company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire Hathaway. They now consider this, as well as the original textile company purchase an investing mistake. But, they both admit that they have learned from their mistakes. Now, when buying companies or common stocks, they look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements. They look to what managements do more than what managements say.
Along with learning about GEICO’s low cost advantage from Lorimer Davidson, Warren Buffett learned some things from studying Phil Fisher, Philip Carret, and Henry Singleton. Buffett met Phil Fisher in the early Sixties, after reading his first book. Phil Fisher was a deep thinker into the nature of managements and their business growth potential. According to Buffett, “His ideas, like those of Ben Graham, were simple but powerful, and I wanted to meet the man whose teachings had such an influence on me…It's been over 40 years since I integrated Phil's thinking into my investment philosophy.”
So, part of developing your “circle of competence” is reading, learning, observing and integrating sound ideas into your investment philosophy. According to Buffett, he and Charlie Munger “just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.”
Buffett and Munger’s Goal at BRK:
Our long-term economic goal is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress.
How do we develop a better frame of reference and make better investing decisions? As you now know, Filter One is to “Develop a Better Understanding” of the company and its products. I got interested in looking at how Buffett and Munger frame their decisions when I was in business school at Purdue University Calumet. This is a quick summary about my views on their “framing.”
Framing in behavioral finance is the choosing of particular words to present a given set of facts. And, framing can influence our choices. Tversky and Kahneman described "Prospect Theory" in 1979 using framed questions. Tversky and Kahneman found that contrary to expected utility theory, people placed different weights on gains and losses and on different ranges of probability. They also found that individuals are much more distressed by prospective losses than they are happy by equivalent gains. Some have concluded that investors typically consider the loss of $1 twice as painful as the pleasure received from a $1 gain. Others believe that this work helps to explain patterns of irrationality, inconsistency, and incompetence in the ways human beings arrive at decisions and choices when faced with uncertainty. An increasing body of literature on framing supports a tendency for people to take more risks when seeking to avoid losses as opposed to securing gains.
Takemura (1992) showed that the effects of framing are likely to be lower when subjects are warned in advance that they will be required to justify their choices, and when more time is allowed for arriving at their choices. Luckily, Buffett and Munger seem to have arrived at practical use of these optimal framing ideas earlier than most.
They try to keep this simple. Notice this example from the latest 2007 annual report:
The Pritzker family decided to gradually sell or reorganize certain of its holdings, including Marmon, a company operating 125 businesses, managed through nine sectors. Marmon’s largest operation is Union Tank Car, which together with a Canadian counterpart owns 94,000 rail cars that are leased to various shippers. The original cost of this fleet is $5.1 billion. All told, Marmon has $7 billion in sales and about 20,000 employees. We will soon purchase 60% of Marmon and will acquire virtually all of the balance within six years. Our initial outlay will be $4.5 billion, and the price of our later purchases will be based on a formula tied to earnings.
A simple valuation example here will demostrate this bargain purchase in a well run company. For fun, lets do a fair "replacement cost" estimate on the 94,000 railcars alone.
94,000 x what? Made out of steel, the boxcar cost about $45000 a copy in 1980. A buddy of mine, says that $90,000 would be a fair price to pay for a mid-age mid-use rail car which can be depreciated over about 40-50 years. So, 94,000 x $90,000 = 8.46 Billion.... just in railcars alone. Furthermore, consider that the Marmon Group is composed of 125 different companies. And, I may be understating the replacement cost of a mid-age mid-use rail car.
Buffett and Munger have employed the principles taught by Dave Dodd and Ben Graham. In my view, Buffett and Munger overcome the conventional framing effects thru rational and thorough business analysis. They simply avoid getting into judgments in some fields. Warren Buffet has said: "If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are operating well within our circle of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter. Predicting the long-term economics of companies that operate in fast-changing industries is simply far beyond our perimeter." I call their approach the compounding success theory because I imagined how their sequence of rational decisions push the probability of investment return success into the upper percentiles.
In my masters paper, I must admit that I got too wordy. I have come to realize that the Four Filters encapsulate the most important contributions of John Burr Williams, Benjamin Graham, Phillip Fisher, Warren Buffett, and Charles Munger. Each of the great investors learn from knowledgeable others.
While everyone may take a little different approach to measuring both quantitative and qualitative value; in my view, each of the Four Filters delivers something especially valuable. They help get us closer to the real "intrinsic value" of a good business.
Wednesday, March 05, 2008
Book: "The Four Filters"
Think: "Practical Best Practices in Behavioral Finance"
My book would be half the size of Charles' "Getting Started in ValueInvesting," and it would focus narrowly on the merits of the "behavioral science"aspects of Warren Buffett's approach.
It could be read on a plane trip across the country.
For sample of my writings, see:
http://www.frips.com/cst.htm
I will describe how the Four Filters relate to Behavioral Finance and how the Four Filters enhance the investment decision making process.
Monday, March 03, 2008
USG
USG Corporation (USG), through its subsidiaries, is a manufacturer and distributor of building materials, producing a range of products for use in residential, non-residential, and repair and remodel construction, as well as products used in certain industrial processes. The Company's operations are organized into three segments: North American Gypsum, Building Products Distribution and Worldwide Ceilings, the net sales of which accounted for approximately 48%, 38% and 14%, respectively, during the year ended December 31, 2007. The Home Depot, Inc. accounted for approximately 11% of USG's net sales in 2007.
USG Corporation , USG has a (5-year annual average) net income growth rate of negative 11.3 . What competitive advantages does it have? Brand, Technology, Cost of Production, Distribution Network? Are possible advantages sustainable? Does USG have a solid mix of Product, Pricing Power, Placement, and Promotions? When buying companies or common stocks, look for understandable first-class businesses, with enduring competitive advantages, accompanied by first-class managements.
USG has a current market price is 33.18 Using an assumed growth rate of -4.5 percent, the estimated Intrinsic Value is 18.67 per share from ValuePro.net, and there does not appear to be a bargain or 'margin of safety' present here. However, using an assumed growth rate of 7 percent, the estimated Intrinsic Value is 68.36 per share from ValuePro.net, and this may or may not indicate a bargain of 35 dollars. Is it a possible Value Trap? If the growth assumptions used in estimating the Intrinsic Value are accurate and sustainable, this may or may not indicate a price-to-value ratio of .49 , and a possible margin of safety of 51 percent.
The current price/earnings ratio = 42.6 It's current return on capital = 2.09. Using a debt to equity ratio of .56, USG Corporation shows a current return on equity = 4.12
Some industries have higher ROE because they require no assets, such as consulting firms. Other industries require large infrastructure builds before they generate a penny of profit, such as oil refiners. Generally, capital-intensive businesses have higher barriers to entry, which limit competition. But, high-ROE firms with small asset bases have lower barriers to entry. Thus, such firms face more business risk because competitors can replicate their success without having to obtain much outside funding. Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can invest at incremental returns that are enticing; only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor. The wonderful companies sustain a competitive advantage, produce free cash flow, and use debt wisely.
Automatic Warning, ( above 0.5 ) on this current debt to equity level of .56
Does USG Corporation make for an intelligent investment or speculation today? Time is said to be the friend of the wonderful company and the enemy of the mediocre one. Before making an investment decision, seek understanding about the company, its products, and its sustainable competitive advantages over competitors. Next, look for able and trustworthy managers who are focused more on value than just growth. Finally ask: Is there a bargain relative to its intrinsic value per share today? Great investment opportunities come around when excellent companies are surrounded by unusual circumstances that cause the stock to be misapraised. In terms of Opportunity Cost, is USG the best place to invest our money today? What about growth in Free Cash Flow?
Excerpts, comments, and news items: http://finance.yahoo.com/q/h?s=USG
Portions of this report are generated in budlab software on 08-03-03 . Budlab software was designed to help me produce a report that emphasizes conservativism and rationality when making an investment decision.
Recession and Opportunities
Our country appears to be in an economic recession. This will be a painful time to many families and many businesses. Eventually, our country will pull out of this recessionary or stagflationary time into another growth era.
From a Value Investing point of view, quality bargains will be revealed. This will bring equity purchase opportunities because markets tend to overreact. Looking for "mispriced opportunites" is the foundation of sensible investing.
Be on the lookout for QB. Quality Bargains.
Elimination Process and its Effects
No shocker here, the underlying business is always more important than stock's market price.
This one caught me by surprise at first until I remembered WEB talking about the importance of the human mind casting out less than desirable purchases. In the talk to MBA students in Tennessee, Buffett mentioned the reason why great chess champions can beat IBM's best supercomputers. An experienced chess champ has the ability to cast off a lot of information noise.
A lot of focus on real free cash flow
And the sustainable competitive advantage therein
386+146 = 532 times !
A preposition meaning connected or associated with. WEB and CM have lot of experiences to form pattern comparisons
140, capital
There is a lot of talk in the writings about able and trustworthy managers and numerous examples
This is interesting mainly because the concept of market get mentioned so much further down this word frequency list.
A Bargain Purchase
For fun, lets do a fair "replacement cost" estimate on the 94,000 railcars alone.
94,000 x what.?
Made out of steel, the boxcar cost about $45000 a copy in 1980. A buddy of mine, says that $90,000 would be a fair price to pay for a mid-use rail car which can be depreciated over about 50 years.
94,000 x $90,000 = 8.46 Billion.... just in railcars alone. Furthermore, consider that the Marmon Group is composed of 125 different companies.
Charles Mizrahi's Book: Getting Started in Value Investing
Why did Buffett and BRK buy stock in Kraft ?
Why did Buffett and BRK buy stock in Kraft ? Let's examine the reasons together.Brands? Costs Controls? Expanding Markets? Share Buybacks? Irene Rosenfeld?
Berkshire Hathaway, bought more than 132 million shares of food company Kraft, according to a document filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission Thursday. Kraft Foods Inc. (KFT), through its subsidiaries, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of packaged foods and beverages in the United States, Canada, Europe, Latin America, Asia Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. The Company manufactures and markets packaged food products, consisting principally of beverages, cheese, snacks, convenient meals and various packaged grocery products. The Company operates in two segments: Kraft North America Commercial and Kraft International Commercial. It has operations in 72 countries and sells its products in more than 155 countries.
Kraft Foods, KFT has a (5-year annual average) net income growth rate of negative 4.71 . The company is looking forward to a 7-9% forward growth rate. What competitive advantages does it have? Brand, Technology, Cost of Production, Distribution Network? Are possible advantages sustainable? It's current market price is 29.31
The estimated Intrinsic Value, using an assumed 7% forward growth rate, is 43.39 per share from ValuePro.net, and this may or may not indicate a bargain of 14 dollars. Is it a possible Value Trap? If the 7% growth assumptions used in estimating the Intrinsic Value are accurate and sustainable, this may or may not indicate a price-to-value ratio of .67 , and a possible margin of safety of 33 percent in a good company with good brands selling at a fair price.
The current price/earnings ratio = 18.2 It's current return on capital = 5.41 Using a debt to equity ratio of .77, Kraft Foods shows a current return on equity = 9.32 Some industries have higher ROE because they require no assets, such as consulting firms. Other industries require large infrastructure builds before they generate a penny of profit, such as oil refiners. You cannot conclude that consulting firms are better investments than refiners just because of their ROE.
Generally, capital-intensive businesses have high barriers to entry, which limit competition. But high-ROE firms with small asset bases have lower barriers to entry. Thus, such firms face more business risk because competitors can replicate their success without having to obtain much outside funding. Automatic Warning, ( above 0.5 ) on this current debt to equity level of .77
From 2007 excerpts, the company expects that revenue will grow 3% to 4% on an organic basis in 2008 and that "we'll hit our stride" by 2009, said Chief Executive Irene Rosenfeld in a written release. "We'll fully realize the financial benefits of our investments and deliver our long-term targets of at least 4% organic net revenue growth and 7% to 9% EPS growth." In addition to "rewiring" the company, Rosenfeld said Kraft intends to "reframe" its product categories to make them more relevant to consumers, to better exploit its sales abilities and to drive down costs.
One key is to expand the focus in larger, faster-growing categories. As an example, Rosenfeld cited moving away from dying sectors like processed cheese slices and into sandwich, snacking and high-end cheeses. Also important is grabbing market share away from restaurants, she said, vowing that Kraft will strive to provide "restaurant-quality food at home in the office or anywhere ... at a fraction of the cost." Frozen pizza's a case in point. With brands like Jacks' and Tombstone, Kraft has long been a major player in the $4 billion category. Then, about 10 years ago it went after the $11 billion chain business with higher-end offerings like DiGiorno. And now, Rosenfeld said, "we are setting our sights on the $20 billion local pizzeria" category.
Does Kraft Foods make for an intelligent investment or speculation today? Time is said to be the friend of the wonderful company and the enemy of the mediocre one. Before making an investment decision, seek understanding about the company, its products, and its sustainable competitive advantages over competitors. Next, look for able and trustworthy managers who are focused more on value than just growth.
Finally ask: Is there a bargain relative to its intrinsic value per share today? In terms of Opportunity Cost, is KFT the best place to invest your money today? I do not know enough about KFT, but, I am open to talking and discussing Kraft.
Bank of America
BAC also buying Countrywide Financial. While Countrywide reported one in three of its subprime mortgages were delinquent at the end of 2007, and the company lost $422 million in the fourth quarter, BofA chief executive officer Kenneth Lewis has said Countrywide's financial results were consistent with the bank's due diligence and agreed-upon purchase price of $4 billion. The purchase will make Charlotte, N.C.-based BofA (NYSE: BAC) the nation's largest mortgage lender and loan servicer. The deal is slated to close in the third quarter.
Perhaps, my generated report below will also help you better understand this purchase.
Bank of America Corporation (Bank of America) is a bank holding company. Bank of America provides a range of banking and non-banking financial services and products through three business segments: Global Consumer and Small Business Banking, Global Corporate and Investment Banking, and Global Wealth and Investment Management. In December 2006, the Company sold its retail and commercial business in Hong Kong and Macau (Asia Commercial Banking business) to China Construction Bank. In October 2006, BentleyForbes, a commercial real estate investment and operations company, acquired Bank of America Plaza in Atlanta from CSC Associates, a partnership of Cousins Properties Incorporated and the Company. In June 2007, the Company acquired the reverse mortgage business of Seattle Mortgage Company, an indirect subsidiary of Seattle Financial Group, Inc.
Bank of America, BAC has a (5-year annual average) net income growth rate of 9.87 . What competitive advantages does it have? Brand, Technology, Cost of Production, Distribution Network? Are possible advantages sustainable? Does BAC have a solid mix of Product, Pricing Power, Placement, and Promotions? When buying companies or common stocks, look for understandable first-class businesses, with enduring competitive advantages, accompanied by first-class managements.
BAC has a current market price is 38.84 Using an assumed growth rate of 7 percent, the estimated Intrinsic Value is 92.89 per share from ValuePro.net, and this may or may not indicate a bargain of 54 dollars. Is it a possible Value Trap? If the growth assumptions used in estimating the Intrinsic Value are accurate and sustainable, this may or may not indicate a price-to-value ratio of .42 , and a possible margin of safety of 58 percent.
The current price/earnings ratio = 12.It's current return on capital = UnavailableUsing a debt to equity ratio of 4.16, Bank of America shows a current return on equity = 10.8
Some industries have higher ROE because they require no assets, such as consulting firms. Other industries require large infrastructure builds before they generate a penny of profit, such as oil refiners. Generally, capital-intensive businesses have higher barriers to entry, which limit competition. But, high-ROE firms with small asset bases have lower barriers to entry. Thus, such firms face more business risk because competitors can replicate their success without having to obtain much outside funding. Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can invest at incremental returns that are enticing; only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor. The wonderful companies sustain a competitive advantage, produce free cash flow, and use debt wisely.
Automatic Warning, ( above 0.5 ) on this current debt to equity level of 4.16
Does Bank of America make for an intelligent investment or speculation today? Time is said to be the friend of the wonderful company and the enemy of the mediocre one. Before making an investment decision, seek understanding about the company, its products, and its sustainable competitive advantages over competitors. Next, look for able and trustworthy managers who are focused more on value than just growth. Finally ask: Is there a bargain relative to its intrinsic value per share today? Great investment opportunities come around when excellent companies are surrounded by unusual circumstances that cause the stock to be misapraised. In terms of Opportunity Cost, is BAC the best place to invest our money today?
What about growth in Free Cash Flow?
Excerpts, comments, and news items: http://finance.yahoo.com/q/h?s=BAC
Portions of this report are generated in budlab software on 08-03-03 . Budlab software was designed to help me produce a report that emphasizes conservativism and rationality when making an investment decision.